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THE UNITED STATES AND THE HOLODOMOR

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Abstract

For the third time in history Ukraine has become a battlefield in the geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West. While Woodrow Wilson made "the world safe for democracy," his principle of self-determination did not apply to Ukrainians; thus, Ukraine's independence was sacrificed for the sake of "Russian unity." The consequences were the Red Terror and Lenin's famine of 1921–1923 in Ukraine that drowned in blood its national liberation movement. Lenin's disciple, Joseph Stalin, consolidated the totalitarian system and implemented his predecessor's policy toward Ukraine that led to physical, biological, and cultural genocide against the largest non-Russian captive nation. Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration not only did nothing, but also never acknowledged publicly Stalin's crimes. American journalists along with politicians participated, albeit indirectly, in the Holodomor denial. The rehabilitation of Stalinism in Russia, revision of the past, and Holodomor denial have led to further escalation of violence on the eve of the ninetieth anniversary of the crime. President Joseph Biden has called Russia's actions in Ukraine genocide. The next step is to draw a parallel to the Holodomor and respond to that denial by bringing the perpetrators of today's genocide before an international tribunal to restore the rule of law and justice.

Keywords: *Holodomor, international law, genocide, Russia's war against Ukraine, the United States.*

СПОЛУЧЕНІ ШТАТИ ТА ГОЛОДОМОР

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Анотація

Україна втретє в історії стала полем бою в геополітичній боротьбі між Росією та Заходом. Хоча Вудро Вільсон зробив «світ безпечним для демократії», його принцип самовизначення не застосовувався до українців; таким чином незалежність України була принесена в жертву «русскому единству». Наслідками стали червоний терор і ленінський голод 1921–1923 років в Україні, які потопили в крові її національно-визвольний рух. Учень Леніна, Йосип Сталін, зміцнив тоталітарну систему та реалізував політику свого попередника щодо України, яка призвела до фізичного, біологічного та культурного геноциду проти найбільшої поневоленої неросійської нації.

Адміністрація Франкліна Д. Рузвельта не тільки нічого не зробила, але й ніколи публічно не визнавала злочини Сталіна. Американські журналісти разом із політиками брали, хоч і опосередковану, участь у запереченні Голодомору. Реабілітація сталінізму в Росії, ревізія минулого, заперечення Голодомору призвели до подальшої ескалації насильства напередодні 90-ї річниці злочину. Президент Джозеф Байден назвав дії Росії в Україні геноцидом. Наступний крок — провести паралель із Голодомором і відповісти на заперечення, притягнувши винних у сьогоднішній геноцид перед міжнародний трибунал для відновлення верховенства права та справедливості.

Ключові слова: *Голодомор, міжнародне право, геноцид, російська війна проти України, США.*

Introduction

The "Cold War," a geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West, actually began after World War I, not after World War II. It emerged from the division of the world into two systems: Woodrow Wilson's democracy and Vladimir Lenin's dictatorship.[1] Wilson's policy of the "one, and indivisible Russia"[2] prevented Ukraine from asserting its right to self-determination. Franklin D. Roosevelt took it even further by granting diplomatic recognition to the Stalinist regime, which already committed atrocities in Ukraine, effectively burying Ukraine's dream of its independence for decades.

During these two U.S. presidential administrations, the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse[3] — war, pestilence, famine, and death — ravaged Ukraine, which became the battlefield between Russia and the West in the twentieth century. Millions of people perished during Lenin's famine of 1921–1923 in Ukraine[4] and even more during Stalin's Great Famine of 1932–1933, the apogee of the Holodomor, which was a genocide the world forgot and erased from history for over half a century. It was not until 1988 that the U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine condemned Stalin and his associates for perpetrating genocide against Ukrainians,[5] but no international tribunal prosecuted the perpetrators.

Now, ninety years later, Ukraine has once again become a battlefield between Russia and the West due to the rehabilitation of Stalinism, revision of the past,

[1] Eugene P. Trani and Donald E. Davis, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the Cold War," *World Affairs* 180, no. 4 (2017): 25–46, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26510625.

[2] Wolodymyr Stojko, "The Attitude of the United States Towards Ukrainian Statehood, 1917–1920," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, LVII, no. 3–4 (2001): 209–23, esp. 216.

[3] The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse are figures in the Christian scriptures, first appearing in the Book of Revelation, a piece of apocalypse literature written by John of Patmos. It is also the title of Viktor Vasnetsov's painting, created in 1887 during his work in Kyiv decorating St. Vladimir's Cathedral.

[4] Vasyl' Marochko, "Lenins'kyy liudomor 1921–1923 rr.: 'bratniy' rozpodil smerti," *Slovo Prosvity*, 19–25 kvitnia 2018.

[5] U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine, *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932–1933: Report to Congress* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988; hereafter: *Report to Congress*), vii.

and Holodomor denial.[6] The seeds of genocidal violence were planted in the 1920s when the Wilson administration allowed Ukraine to be "swallowed up by insatiable maw of red Moscow."[7] The Kremlin's genocide against Ukrainians reached its peak in 1932–1933, but the Roosevelt administration silenced the truth about Stalin's crimes for political reasons. The blindness of the U.S. leader once more "allowed Moscow with American lend-lease support to be the conqueror."[8] As we approach the ninetieth anniversary of the Holodomor, Russia's neo-Stalinist war of aggression against Ukraine poses a serious challenge to the U.S. government and has far-reaching implications for European and global security.

Wilson's Policy of "Indivisible Russia"

President Wilson's "Fourteen Points" on how to deal with the future world order, presented on January 8, 1918, included his commitment to preserve the territorial integrity of what was referred to as "Russia"[9] at that time. The Ukrainian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference presented a map of Ukraine with a prospectus outlining the geographic boundaries of territories historically settled by Ukrainians, including the region of Kuban in the Northern Caucasus.[10] Unfortunately, their bid for recognition of Ukraine's independence within its historic territories was rejected, and Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Before the Paris Peace Conference, there was no significant effort to address the potential threat of Russian expansionism to European security. Ukraine's struggle for national liberation from the oppressive policies of German and Russian occupiers went unnoticed by the Big Four.[11] It was assumed that a democratic

[6] Vasyl' Marochko, "Russkiy Mir' u Feodosii: zaborona slova pro Holodomor," *Istorychna pravda*, 28 sichnia 2015, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/columns/2015/01/28/146975/.

[7] Clarence A. Manning, "Woodrow Wilson and American Foreign Policy," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* XII, no. 4 (1956): 332–38, esp. 338.

[8] Manning, "Woodrow Wilson and American Foreign Policy," 338.

[9] For more on the impact of Wilson's policies on the modern political structuring of Eastern Europe, see Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2020).

[10] The map of Ukraine was included in *Mémoire sur l'indépendance de l'Ukraine présenté à la Conférence de la paix par la délégation de la république ukrainienne*, an official publication of the joint government of the Ukrainian National Republic and Western Ukrainian National Republic (after January 22, 1919, western and eastern parts of Ukraine were reunited). The map was reproduced in an article posted by Likbez.org at http://likbez.org.ua/ua/ukrainskaya-respublika-karta-dlya-parizhskoj-mirnoj-konferentsii-1919-g.html.

[11] For more on Directory's negotiations with the representatives of the Entente and a list of demands, see Isaak Mazepa, *Ukrayina v ohni i buri revoliutsii*, 1917–1921, Chastyna I (Praha: vyd-vo "Prometey," 1950), 96–114. Mazepa, an eyewitness of the events, noted that the Ukrainian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference consisted of H. Sydorenko and A. Petrushevych, who arrived in Paris on January 20, 1919. The remaining delegates were stuck in other European countries awaiting visas to France.

constitutional government would be established in Russia.[12] A group of about 150 political and social scientists organized by Wilson's adviser and long-time friend, Col. Edward House, presented the *Inquiry* report[13] to President Wilson in January 1919. The authors of the report recommended the formation of an independent Ukrainian state, which would have included Crimea.[14] However, Wilson's decision was influenced by his top Russian adviser, Frank A. Golder,[15] who urged the president: "For the sake of the peace of the world, for the sake of Russia and Ukraine, for the sake of the Central Powers themselves, Great Russia and Little Russia must be united into a strong and free nation."[16]

The official stance of the United States was reinforced by the Department of State, which directed the Liquidation Commission[17] not to extend credit sales of surplus stocks to Ukraine. This included clothing, blankets, medical supplies, and motor equipment stored by the American Forces in France. A telegraphic report from the U.S. Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State advised: "The recognized Ukrainian Mission in Paris, which has purchased large quantity of American Army supplies, represents the Petliura Government."[18]

Secretary of State Robert Lansing ordered an investigation of the transaction between the Ukrainian Mission in Paris and American military authorities.

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[12] "Russia Democratized," *Nation*, vol. CIV (March 22, 1917), 327 (editorial); quoted in *American Views of Soviet Russia, 1917–1965*, ed. Peter G. Filene (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), 2.

[13] At the request of President Wilson, Col. E. M. House began to assemble a group of experts to collect and collate data on geographical, ethnological, historical, economic, and political problems of Europe and other areas of the world in preparation for the peace conference, which should follow World War I. This group of experts, called "The Inquiry," was under the direction first of Sidney E. Mezes and later of Isaiah Bowman. The bulk of The Inquiry's records are housed in the National Archives, where they form part of Record Group 256 ("Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace"). See https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/related-records/rg-256.

[14] An Outline of Tentative Recommendations of January 21, 1919, Inquiry Archives, National Archives; quoted in Constantine Warvariv, "America and the Ukrainian National Cause, 1917–1920," in *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution*, ed. Taras Hunczak (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977), 371.

[15] Frank A. Golder was the author of two reports on "Ukraine" (one 185 pages long, dated November 1, 1918, Box 24, Folder 372, and another 111 pages long, dated February 15, 1918, Box 24, Folder 373). A third report on "Economic Relations Between Ukraine and European Russia" by I. M. Rubinow is 57 pages long, issued in October 1918, Box 24, Folder 374. See duplicates in the Yale Inquiry Papers, https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/resources/4421.

[16] Inquiry Archives, typewritten document No. 188, National Archives; quoted in Warvariv, "America and the Ukrainian National Cause," 370–71.

[17] The Liquidation Commission was established by an act of Congress as part of the U.S. War Department for the purpose of disposing of surplus war stocks of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe that were held in French warehouses. Such classes of stock as clothing, food, medical equipment, and transportation seemed suitable for relieving hunger and the urgent needs of the peoples and stabilizing the governments of Eastern Europe.

[18] *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937), 779; quoted in Warvariv, "America and the Ukrainian National Cause," 373.

It was revealed that a contract for the purchase of supplies, valued in excess of $11,500,000, had been accepted in April 1919. However, the contract was annulled on January 16, 1920, without any explanation.[19]

On the following day, January 17, Ukrainian leader Petliura sent a note to Allied and U.S. commanders in Paris, stating that for two years since December 3, 1918, "Ukraine alone has been fighting against the third Bolshevik onslaught and attempt to bring communist experiment to Ukraine."[20] He requested free transit through Europe of medical supplies purchased by the Ukrainian representatives in France to help the army and people of Ukraine to withstand existential dual threats from Russian occupation and epidemics of infectious diseases. However, his calls to restore Ukraine's physical well-being to resolve the problem on the Eastern Front went unheeded.

Wilson's policy of "quarantine" and minimal intervention did not seek the "disruption of Russia." The U.S. intervention was far from consistently anti-Bolshevik as evidenced by transfer of ammunition to Bolshevik forces.[21] The preference for "a unified entity with which to conduct trade" implied the lack of support for potentially viable independence movements.[22] Such policy of "Russia first" distorted the U.S. administration's approach to Ukraine, which is evident from the message the State Department addressed to the U.S. Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris:

> On the basis of past investigations, the Department is disposed to regard the Ukrainian separatist movement as largely the result of Austrian and German propaganda seeking the disruption of Russia. It is unable to perceive an adequate ethnical basis for erecting a separate state and is not convinced that there is a real popular demand for anything more than such greater measure of local autonomy as will naturally result from the establishment in Russia of a modern democratic government, whether federative or not. The Department feels, accordingly, that the policy of the United States, while leaving to future events the determination of the exact character of the

[19] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919*, 787–88; quoted in *ibid*., 375–78.

[20] Symon Petliura, "Nota do Nayvyshchoi Rady Soiuznykh i Spoluchenykh Derzhav u Paryzhi", in. O. Dotsenko, *Litopys Ukrayins'koi revoliutsii*, t. II, kn. 5 (L'viv, 1924), 190–91; reprinted in *Symon Petliura: Statti, lysty, dokumenty* (New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1956), 243–44.

[21] Anthony C. Sutton, *National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union* (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1973), 50.

[22] Grady to Kennedy, September 1, 1919, NARG151 Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Russia, File 520; American–Russian Chamber of Commerce statement, December 23, 1920, NARG59 661.1115/3/5; quoted in Leonard Leshuk, "The Background to U.S. Perceptions of the New Soviet State," in *U.S. Intelligence Perceptions of Soviet Power, 1921–1946* (Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), 26–27. Leonard Leshuk is an independent intelligence analyst in Washington, D.C.

> relations that exist between Great and Little Russia, should tend in the meantime, rather to sustain the principle of essential Russian unity than to encourage separatism.[23]

Due to a lack of accurate information available in the State Department concerning Russia, the readily available misinformation had a great influence. Erroneous perceptions resulted in short-sighted U.S. policy.[24] Secretary of State Lansing was influenced by exaggerated tales about the intentions of German militarism in Ukraine.[25] The misunderstanding and lack of help in the efforts of Ukrainians to secure their liberation aided the Bolsheviks. Without external support, the Ukrainian National Republic collapsed, and the Red Army marched into Ukraine.[26]

The inability of U.S. officials to see the potential threat of Russian expansionism allowed the Russian occupiers to commit violence against civilians in Ukraine. The Kremlin's leaders openly expressed their intent to do so in their decrees and public statements. Their intent was apparent: "We need Ukraine, not its people."[27] Between 1921 and 1923, it took one fifth of the Red Army (one million troops), supplemented by more than 200,000 in punishment battalions and requisitioning squads, to suppress resistance in Ukraine.[28] The struggle for national liberation cost 4 million innocent lives, more than Ukrainian military and civilian deaths in World War I. What followed the Red Terror was Lenin's famine of 1921–1923, in which 2.8 million innocent people died in southeastern Ukraine.[29] At the time, grain confiscated from Ukraine was shipped to the Volga region to rescue the starving in Russia. The American Relief Administration (ARA) initially prioritized assisting Russia, which prolonged starvation in Ukraine till the summer of the

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[23] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919*, 783–84; quoted in Warvariv, "America and the Ukrainian National Cause," 378–79.

[24] Leshuk, "The Background to U.S. Perceptions of the New Soviet State," 27.

[25] "Woodrow Wilson and the Liberation of Nations (Editorial)," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* XII, no. 4 (1956): 293–97, esp. 296.

[26] At the peak of the Russian Civil War (1917–1923), the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, commonly referred to as the Red Army, counted 5.4 million in its ranks, two thirds of whom fought in the former imperial army during World War I. See G. F. Krivosheev, *Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century* (London: Greenhill Books, 1997).

[27] Steven Velychenko, *Life and Death in Revolutionary Ukraine: Living Conditions, Violence, and Demographic Catastrophe, 1917–1923* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2021), 126.

[28] Velychenko, *Life and Death in Revolutionary Ukraine*, 143.

[29] Oleksandr Hladun, "Viddaleni naslidky vtrat naselennia Ukrayiny vid sotsial'nykh katastrof u XX stolitti," *Henotsyd Ukrainy u XX stolitti. Ukraina pid okupatsiynymy rezhymamy: istorychni realii ta postkolonial'nyy syndrom*. Materialy tret'oyi Mizhnarodnoyi naukovo-praktychnoyi konferentsii, L'viv, 4–5 kvitnia 2014 / red. kol.: L. Senyk, B. Morklianyk, R. Pak, M. Fitsuliak, I. Havryliv, M. Chornopyskyy, I. Khoma, A. Fedoryshyn, O. Muzychko, O. Polians'kyy. Vseukrauins'ke hromads'ke ob'iednannia "Tovarystvo vidrodzhennia ukrains'koyi natsii"; L'vivs'kyy natsional'nyy universytet im. I. Franka; Natsional'nyy universytet "L'vivs'ka politekhnika"; Instytut literaturoznavchykh studiy LNU im. I. Franka; KZ LOR "L'vivs'kyy istorychnyy muzey" (L'viv: Dobryy druk, 2015), 337–47.

following year. In total, Ukraine lost between 5.5 to 7.5 million people because of World War I, the war for national liberation, and the famine.[30] The aid provided by the ARA did not exert any real concessions from Russia but rather helped keep Bolsheviks in power.[31]

Roosevelt's Recognition of the USSR

The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as president raised the possibility of American recognition of the Soviet government, promised during his campaign. Roosevelt's decision on the issue was made without the full benefit of the intelligence gathered by the U.S. government. The State Department received reports filed from the U.S. Legation in Riga and the Embassy in Berlin about the guerrilla warfare in the Northern Caucasus and village uprisings in Ukraine in 1930, the widespread starvation reaching from rural districts to larger cities in Ukraine in 1931, the daily deaths occurring in Ukraine in 1932, Postyshev's appointment as Ukraine's new ruler in January 1933, and the executions and imprisonments for "counterrevolutionary sabotage."[32] Despite the reports' accuracy, officials in the State Department failed to connect the dots and instead focused on "Russian agriculture" and "feelings" of the Soviet people,[33] neglecting the extermination of Ukrainians. Even the reports about Postyshev's "pacification" of Ukrainian nationalism[34] — the "Ukrainian problem" — were viewed through the prism of the "anti-peasant policy" of excessive grain procurement rather than the genocidal decimation of Ukrainians.

The Roosevelt administration received letters from Ukrainian diaspora organizations with appeals for help. The first Ukrainian group to send an appeal to a member of the Roosevelt administration was the U.S. World War Veterans of Ukrainian Descent of New York. On September 18, 1933, Vladimir Jurkowsky, the organization's secretary, sent a letter to Postmaster General James J. Farley, who was also chairman of the Democratic Committee in Roosevelt's home state.[35] It contained possible "political dynamite"; thus, the committee referred it to the State

[30] *Holod 1921–1923 rokiv v Ukrayini*: *Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, red. S. V. Kul'chyts'kyy (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1993), 202; Velychenko, *Life and Death in Revolutionary Ukraine, 205.*

[31] Benjamin Weissman, *Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia, 1921–1923* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1974), 202.

[32] James E. Mace, "The American Response to the Famine," in *Report to Congress*, 157–59. See also Leshuk, "The Meaning of Life in the USSR, 1928–33," in *U.S. Intelligence Perceptions of Soviet Power*, 61–64.

[33] U.S. State Department analysts had a very limited and skewed database, as noted by some of the analysts themselves, to have done much more than research at the level of "pop" psychology instead of examination of Soviet military-industrial strength and expansionist ambitions. See Leshuk, "The Meaning of Life in the USSR," 80.

[34] Mace, "The American Response to the Famine," 160.

[35] Vladimir Jurkowsky, Secretary, U.S. World War Veterans of Ukrainian Descent, New York, NY, to Postmaster General James J. Farley, September 18, 1933; 861.48/2449; quoted in *Report to Congress*, 164.

Department. The response on October 11, 1933 from Robert F. Kelley, acknowledging the receipt of "photographs and newspaper clippings relating to the suffering of persons living in the Ukraine," enclosed with the letter addressed to the Postmaster General, was curt: "Your letter and its enclosures have been read with interest."[36] Despite clear evidence, officials in charge of the U.S. government studiously expressed their disinterest.

In November 1933, leaders of the Ukrainian National Women's League of America (UNWLA), one of the most active organizations in the Ukrainian-American community, approached Eleanor Roosevelt with a request to exert some influence to pressure the Soviet government to allow duty-free admission of relief packages through *torgsin*, a network of government stores that sold food in exchange for hard currency or gold. Mrs. Roosevelt replied that although she realized "that the need was very great, she deeply regretted" that she could do nothing to help.[37] This summary of Mrs. Roosevelt's response comes from a letter preserved in UNWLA archives in New York.[38] Eleanor Roosevelt, reflecting on her past life on her seventy-fifth birthday, advised in her *Autobiography*: "I think that one of the reasons it is so difficult for us, as a people, to understand other areas of the world is that we cannot put ourselves imaginatively in their place. We have no famine. But, if we were actually to see people dying of starvation, we would care quite a bit."[39] Eleanor Roosevelt took part in the genocide definition discussions at the United Nations, speaking vis-à-vis the Soviet representative, Andrei Vyshinsky. The Soviets managed to force a dilution of Raphael Lemkin's original and intended broader-scoped definition of genocide. This political tactic worked, because other nations were afraid of not getting any definition at all, if they failed to appease the Soviets on this point.

The UNWLA also published a pamphlet and sent it for comment to the Soviet Embassy on January 3, 1934. A month later it received a letter from Boris Skvirsky, Embassy Counselor, who replied that the idea that the Soviet government was "deliberately killing off the population of the Ukraine" was "wholly grotesque." Claiming that "the Ukrainian population increased at an annual rate of 2% during the past five years," Skvirsky dismissed UNWLA evidence as spurious. The death rate in Ukraine "was the lowest of that of any of the constituent Republics composing the Soviet Union," he stated "and was about 35 percent lower than the pre-war death rate of Tsarist days."[40] The Soviet government denied the famine.

[36] Robert F. Kelley to Vladimir Jurkowsky, October 11, 1933; 861.48/2449; quoted in *ibid*., 164.

[37] Dr. Lubow Margolena Hansen to Dr. Nellie Pelecovich, January 30, 1934, 2–3; Archives of the Ukrainian National Women's League of America, New York, NY; quoted in *Report to Congress*, 167.

[38] The UNWLA's president, Iwanna Rozankowsky, provided the document to Dr. James Mace, Staff Director of the U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine.

[39] Eleanor Roosevelt, *The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt* (New York: Harper, 1961), 413.

[40] *Famine in Ukraine* (New York: United Ukrainian Organizations, 1934), 6–7; in *Report to Congress*, 176–77.

The Roosevelt administration sought closer ties with the Soviets and considered the famine as an internal affair. The reality of mass starvation in Ukraine, perpetrated by Stalin and his accomplices, seemed to require a double standard of blindness from American politicians.

When Lenin died in 1924, the Communist *Daily Worker* portrayed with almost religious fervor its conviction — and the conviction of most American leftists — that the light of Lenin's revolution, the "Soviet star of hope," would continue to illuminate and inspire the world.[41] "The building of the Russian myth required no Machiavellian propaganda tricks," noted Eugene Lyons in his *Assignment in Utopia*. "The outside world in depression years had need of it as a fixed beacon in the storm of doubt."[42] Given the rise of Nazism, the Soviet Union seemed to offer the only hope for humanity at that time.

After closely observing Stalin's government policies for two years since opening of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Ambassador William C. Bullitt wrote a dispatch to the Secretary of State, providing his assessment of the future:

> There is genuine admiration in the Soviet Union for American technical efficiency and there is full realization of the fact that the Communist movement in the United States is still completely impotent; but it is believed that the people of the United States will not have sufficient political sense to cope with the problems of the productivity of the modern machine and modern agriculture and that after a series of recoveries and crises the United States too will fall (or rise) into the "heaven" of Communism.
>
> To summarize: The aim of the Soviet Government is and will remain, to produce world revolution. The leaders of the Soviet Union believe that the first step toward this revolution must be to strengthen the defensive and offensive power of the Soviet Union. They believe that within ten years the defense position of the Soviet Union will be absolutely impregnable and that within 15 years the offensive power of the Soviet Union will be sufficient to enable it to consolidate by its assistance any communist government which may be set up in Europe. To maintain peace for the present, to keep the nations of Europe divided, to foster enmity between Japan and the United States, and to gain the blind devotion and obedience of the communists of all countries so that they will act against their own governments at the behest of the Communist Pope in the Kremlin, is the sum of Stalin's policy.[43]

[41] "The Soviet Star of Hope," *The Daily Worker*, 1924; quoted in *Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917–1933* by Peter G. Filene (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 130.

[42] Eugene Lyons, *Assignment in Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1937), 435.

[43] "The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (William C. Bullitt) to the Secretary of State," Moscow, July 19, 1935, Document 241, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Soviet Union, 1933–1939*, eds. E. R. Perkins, Rogers Platt Churchill, and John Gilbert Reid (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 227, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933-39/d241.

These insightful predictions of Ambassador Bullitt reached Washington on August 2, 1935, coming two years after the tragic reality of the extermination by starvation, which caused millions of deaths, had been deliberately concealed. It was during this time that the United States decided to grant diplomatic recognition to the USSR.[44]

Among the journalists complicit in concealing the truth about the genocidal famine in Ukraine was Walter Duranty, Pulitzer Prize winner.[45] Originally from Britain, Duranty served as the *New York Times* correspondent in Moscow, or rather Moscow's man at the *New York Times*, earning the reputation as "the one-legged Anglo-American granddaddy of fake news."[46] He garnered personal attention from Stalin and consistently reported the Communist Party's perspective in his articles.[47] On September 14, 1933, Duranty wrote: "But, as far as this writer could learn, there was nothing like famine conditions."[48] However, he privately informed the British Embassy staff that he believed up to 10 million people might have perished due to the famine, despite downplaying its severity in his dispatches.[49]

The circumstances surrounding Duranty's work in Moscow remain obscured within Stalin's secret archives. On October 27, 1925, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) discussed the potential deportation of Duranty from the Soviet Union, but two days later the decision was revoked.[50] Duranty received the Pulitzer Prize in 1932 for his coverage of "Soviet Russia" the previous year.[51] In one of his dispatches from Moscow on March 31, 1933, he quoted

[44] For a detailed account of the vote in support for recognition, see Filene, *Americans and the Soviet Experiment,* 261, 363.

[45] For more on the role of Walter Duranty in distorting the truth about the Holodomor, see S. J. Taylor, *Stalin's Apologist: Walter Duranty:* The New York Times*'s Man in Moscow* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) and Agnieszka Holland's thriller *Mr. Jones* (Samuel Goldwyn Films, 2020).

[46] Kyle Smith, "Stalin, Famine, and the *New York Times*: Mr. Jones tells the truth about Moscow's man at the Paper of Record," *National Review*, July 2, 2020, https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/07/movie-review-mr-jones-tells-truth-about-new-york-times-communism/.

[47] Walter Duranty admitted to A. W. Klieforth of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin in June 1931 that, "'in agreement with *The New York Times* and the Soviet authorities,' his official dispatches always reflect the official opinion of the Soviet regime and not his own." See Gordon dispatch, June 5, 1931, NARG59 861.5017 LC/268, quoted in Leshuk, *U.S. Intelligence Perceptions of Soviet Power*, 76.

[48] Walter Duranty, "Abundance Found in North Caucasus," in *New York Times*, September 14, 1933, 14, in James William Crowl, "Angels in Stalin's Paradise: Western Reporters in Soviet Russia, A Case Study of Louis Fischer and Walter Duranty" (doctoral diss., University of Virginia, 1978), 162–67.

[49] Mace, "Research on Documents" (typewritten notes), Ukraine Famine Hearing, April 30, 1987, box 16921, Gary Bauer Files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum.

[50] Volodymyr Serhiychuk, *Genocide-Holodomor of Ukrainians, 1932–1933* (Vyshgorod: PP Serhiychuk M. I., 2018), 93.

[51] For more on a campaign to revoke Duranty's Pulitzer Prize, see *Not Worthy: Walter Duranty's Pulitzer Prize and the New York Times*, ed. Lubomyr Luciuk (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 2004).

a grotesque cliché, often attributed to genocidal murderer Stalin, "you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs."[52]

The first reliable report about the forced starvation in Ukraine within the English-speaking world was presented by Gareth Jones, a Welsh journalist.[53] Jones, utilizing his connection to David Lloyd George, obtained a diplomatic visa from the Soviet Embassy in Great Britain.[54] Jones entered the Soviet Union in March 1933 and spent his initial week in Moscow interviewing various individuals, including Communist Party officials, Western correspondents, foreign consuls, Soviet literary figures, and ordinary citizens enduring long bread lines. Jones's handwritten diaries formed the basis for twenty-one articles published between March 31 and April 20, 1933 in the *Evening Standard*, *Daily Express*, *Western Mail*, and *Financial News*.[55] While Jones used the shorthand, popular term "Russia" in his articles as a general description of the famine-affected areas, his diaries specifically mention Ukraine and its particular districts.

Commenting on the British "scare story" being echoed by the American press, Duranty dismissed the notion of a famine in Ukraine, instead labeling it "a serious food shortage." He went ever further, claiming that "There is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition."[56] Reflecting on Duranty's role in covering up the famine, Malcolm Muggeridge, who served as the Moscow correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* during the 1930s, condemned Duranty as the primary villain: "Duranty was the villain of the whole thing. ... He wrote things about the famine and the situation in Ukraine which were laughably wrong. There is no doubt whatever that the authorities could manipulate him."[57]

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[52] For excerpts from Duranty's articles, "Russians Hungry, But Not Starving," March 31, 1933; "Stalin's Mark Is Party Discipline," June 27, 1931; "Stalinism Dominates Russia of Today," June 14, 1931; "Red Army Is Held No Menace to Peace," June 25, 1931; "Stalinism Solving Minorities Problem," June 26, 1931; "Stalin's Russia Is an Echo of Iron Ivan's," December 20, 1931, see Jacques Steinberg, "Word for Word/ Soft Touch; From Our Men in Moscow, In Praise of the Stalinist Future," *New York Times*, October 26, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/26/weekinreview/word-for-word-soft-touch-our-man-moscow-praise-stalinist-future.html?searchResultPosition=2.

[53] In his memoirs, *Assignment in Utopia*, published in New York in 1937, Eugene Lyons, the *United Press* Moscow correspondent, called Jones's articles the first reliable press reports.

[54] Margaret Siriol Colley, Nigel Linsan Colley, and Naomi Field, *More Than a Grain of Truth: The Official Biography of Gareth Jones* (Lume Books, 2005; 2nd edition, 2019). See also a sequel by Margaret Siriol Colley, *Gareth Jones: A Manchukuo Incident* (Nottingham: Alphagraphics, 2001).

[55] Ray Gamache, *Gareth Jones: Eyewitness to the Holodomor* (Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press, 2013). For a complete list of Gareth Jones's articles from 1930 to 1935, see garethjones.org.

[56] "Russians Hungry, But Not Starving," *New York Times*, March 31, 1933.

[57] Interview with Bohdan Nahaylo, Robertsbridge, England, March 1, 1983; quoted in James E. Mace, "The American Press and the Ukrainian Famine," in *Genocide Watch*, edited by Helen Fein (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 113–32, esp. 125.

Both American journalists and politicians colluded with the Soviets in covering up the famine. Despite Duranty's deceit, he was invited to meet with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, and his counsel was sought regarding the recognition of the USSR.[58] Roosevelt broached the issue in July 1932, soon after winning the nomination, at a lunch with Duranty.[59] This interaction aimed to remove any obstacles, including Stalin's genocide, and shape American public opinion in alignment with the desired narrative before negotiations. Upon his return to the United States in April 1934, journalist Eugene Lyons acknowledged that at the time it was considered socially unacceptable to speak the truth about Stalin's crimes because it was perceived as "an offense against good taste" within "enlightened" circles.[60] James E. Mace, executive director of the U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine, noted that Roosevelt, along with many others of his time, shared the same blind spot and indifference toward the victims: "Poignant, often agonizing pleas for some type of intervention or assistance for the famine victims … were treated with courteous indifference."[61]

Malcolm Muggeridge stood out as one of the few journalists who fearlessly expressed the truth. In an interview with Marco Carynnyk, a Canadian writer, he recounted how L. B. Golden, the general secretary of the Save the Children Fund, which had been very active during the famine of 1921–1922 in Soviet Russia and Ukraine, approached the British Foreign Office in August 1933 seeking advice.[62] Golden received troubling information about famine in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus from private letters. However, the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy assured him that the harvest was a "bumper one," leading Golden to inquire whether a public appeal should be made. The British Foreign Office advised against taking any action. Muggeridge captured the British government's stance: "The Soviet authorities were not admitting to a famine, and therefore it was agreed that nothing should be said."[63] This silence persisted due to "the calculated campaign of

[58] Leshuk, *U.S. Intelligence Perceptions of Soviet Power*, 77.

[59] *New York Times*, July 26, 1932, quoted in *Report to Congress*, 182.

[60] Eugene Lyons, "To Tell or Not to Tell," *Harper's*, CLXXI, June 1935; reprinted in Filene, *American Views of Soviet Russia*, 107–8.

[61] Mace, "The American Response to the Famine," 183.

[62] "L. B. Golden, General Secretary of the Save the Children Fund, to Sir Robert Vansittart, 24 August 1933, and the Foreign Office to Edward Coote, 7 September, 1933," in *The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932–1933*, edited by Marco Carynnyk, Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, and Bohdan S. Kordan (Kingston: Limestone Press, 1988), 287–89.

[63] Marco Carynnyk, "Malcolm Muggeridge on Stalin's Famine: 'Deliberate' and 'Diabolical' Starvation," in *The Great Famine in Ukraine: The Unknown Holocaust*, eds. Roma Hadzewycz, George B. Zarycky, and Marta Kolomayets (Jersey City: Svoboda Press for Ukrainian National Association, 1983), 50. Originally published in *New Perspectives* (Toronto), February 19, 1983, 4–5.

misinformation that the Soviet authorities mounted to conceal their doings."[64] And British and the U.S. leaders turned a "blind eye to murder"[65] and "appeased" the Soviet dictator.[66]

James E. Mace's assessment of American response to the Holodomor highlighted that both the State Department and the White House "had access to plentiful and timely intelligence" about the tragedy of the forced starvation in Ukraine from 1932 to 1933. However, they "made a conscious decision not only to do nothing about it, but to never acknowledge it publicly." The primary focus of American policymakers at the time was the competition between American and Soviet wheat exports on the global market, overshadowing concerns about the treatment of non-Russian nations under Soviet nationality policy.[67] Despite this, President Roosevelt was determined to establish and maintain positive relations with the USSR. Dr. Mace concluded that "the U.S. government participated, albeit indirectly, in what is perhaps the single most successful denial of genocide in history."[68]

Had the U.S. government paid greater attention to fact-based analyses during that period, it could have potentially helped policymakers avoid, or at least prepare for, the events that unfolded in the subsequent years. A Latvian Minister to the USSR warned: "If the United States recognized the Soviets, any lingering hope of a change in Russia would have to be definitely abandoned."[69] Another prophetic intelligence analysis disregarded by the U.S. government came from Military Attaché Major Emer Yeager in Warsaw in February 1931: "… if Germany comes in, the two can crush Poland before France can interfere."[70] The Military Attaché also reported on Ukrainian resistance to Russian policies.[71] He warned that the five-year plan had military objectives rather than solely economic ones. Unfortunately, these dispatches were silently filed away and forgotten. Furthermore, the Military Intelligence Division deliberately destroyed valuable information regarding the Ukrainian separatist movement.[72] The significance of these reports was not fully grasped, contributing to a lack of understanding and appropriate action by U.S. authorities.

[64] Marco Carynnyk, "Blind Eye to Murder: Britain, the United States and the Ukrainian Famine of 1933," in *Famine in Ukraine, 1932–1933*, eds. Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 110. For more on the origins of the Soviet politics of silence, see Olga Bertelsen, "Starvation and Violence amid the Soviet Politics of Silence: 1928–1929," *Genocide Studies International* 11, no. 1 (2017): 38–67.

[65] Carynnyk, "Blind Eye to Murder," in *Famine in Ukraine,* eds. Serbyn and Krawchenko, 109.

[66] Hiroaki Kuromiya, "Democracies and the Holodomor," *Clio World*, no. 1 (2020): 28–35.

[67] James E. Mace, "The American Response to the Famine," in *Report to Congress*, 151.

[68] Mace, "The American Response to the Famine," 181.

[69] NARG165 2657-D-987, quoted in Leshuk, *U.S. Intelligence Perceptions of Soviet Power*, 81.

[70] Yeager dispatch, February 23, 1931, NARG165 2037-1814/28, quoted in *ibid*., 70, 81.

[71] Yeager dispatch, September 5, 1929, NARG165 2037-1833/33; Military Attaché Warsaw dispatch, February 11, 1930, NARG165 2037-1833/34, quoted in *ibid*., 61.

[72] Leshuk, *U.S. Intelligence Perceptions of Soviet Power*, 61.

The Biden Administration's Stance

The one-hundred-year existential struggle between democracy and totalitarianism has taken a new turn with neo-Stalinist Vladimir Putin's agenda as he seeks "nothing less than to return Russia to the center of global politics by challenging the primacy that the United States has enjoyed."[73] As Ivo H. Daalder, president of the Chicago Council of World Affairs and former U.S. Ambassador to NATO (2009–2013) observed, "under Vladimir Putin, Russia has embarked on a systematic challenge to the West." The United States came out of World War I as a leading industrial power. World War II lifted the United States out of the Great Depression, and the country expanded its economic and military power as a result. Whether the United States will win a "second Cold War" with Russia is too early to tell.[74]

Putin's revanchist ambitions to expand Russian influence in the "near abroad" and counter NATO have caused varying reactions, with some anticipating this move and others shocked by it. Sensing "belated success"[75] in his "active measures" to undermine the United States from within, in the wake of the January 6, 2021 assault on the U.S. Capitol,[76] Putin deployed his armed forces to the borders of Ukraine. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021[77] signaled to Putin that his "special military operation" in Ukraine must go ahead.

Even before Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Biden administration had already formulated a policy to deter Russia. The policy included implementing economic sanctions against Russia, diplomatically isolating Russia, providing military and economic support to Ukraine, and strengthening NATO's defenses.[78] About three weeks after the first Russian missiles fell, the U.S. Congress allocated $13 billion in emergency aid for Kyiv as part of an omnibus bill. In total, Congress appropriated $113 billion in aid to Ukraine in four

[73] Ivo H. Daalder, "Responding to Russia's Resurgence: Not Quiet on the Eastern Front," *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 6 (2017): 30.

[74] Robert D. Blackwill and Philip H. Gordon, *Containing Russia: How to Respond to Moscow's Intervention in U.S. Democracy and Growing Geopolitical Challenges*, Special Report No. 80, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, January 6, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/containing-russia.

[75] John A. Gentry, "Belated Success: Soviet Active Measures against the United States," *American Intelligence Journal* 39, no. 2 (2022): 151–70.

[76] Francis Fukuyama, "January 6 and Geopolitics," *American Purpose*, January 6, 2022, https://www.americanpurpose.com/blog/fukuyama/january-6-and-geopolitics/.

[77] See commentary by R. Clarke Cooper, "Shaky territory for U.S. alliances," in "Experts react: The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is complete. What's next?" *Atlantic Council*, August 30, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-is-complete-whats-next/#cooper.

[78] "Fact Sheet: On One Year Anniversary of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, Biden Administration Announces Actions to Support Ukraine and Hold Russia Accountable," *White House Briefing*, February 24, 2023.

installments, with approximately 60%, or $67 billion, designated for military assistance.[79]

In September 2022, Ukrainian armed forces achieved significant success against the Russian Army in Kharkiv. Two months later, in Kherson, Russian commanders ordered a retreat from the Dnipro River's western bank to conserve manpower and equipment. However, by the war's 18-month mark, lawmakers began to question whether the United States could sustain the level of support in perpetuity, especially when the White House had stated time and again that the United States would support Ukraine "for as long as it takes," meaning arming and financing Ukraine's war effort against Russia until Kyiv achieved a total military victory. The U.S. intelligence community also expressed skepticism about whether Kyiv's counteroffensive, planned for the summer of 2023, could break through three layers of Russian defensive fortifications.[80]

By August 24, 2023, Ukraine's Independence Day, the Biden administration accomplished two objectives: to assist Ukraine in resisting Russia's aggression and to ensure NATO was kept out of the conflict with a nuclear-armed Russia. American minimalist policy of pipette-like weapons supplies resulted in a grueling 10-week long Ukrainian counteroffensive along three points of the 600-mile front line. The desired goal of a full Russian troop withdrawal, which Ukraine had been pursuing for over a year and a half, remained elusive. Some experts and analysts suggested adjusting U.S. policy by pivoting toward armed neutrality so that Ukraine could keep the territory it held.[81]

On October 19, 2023, against the domestic political backdrop of a barely avoided government shutdown and a speaker-less House of Representatives, President Biden sought to unify the American people as defenders of democracy. He gave a powerful speech from the Oval Office laying out the existential challenge presented to global order and U.S. leadership by Putin's aggression against Ukraine and Hamas's deadly attack on Israel on October 7, Putin's 71st birthday. In his speech, Biden requested $100 billion dollars for the "arsenal of democracy," borrowing a phrase from President Franklin D. Roosevelt.[82] Of this amount, $60 billion would be allocated for Ukraine, $10 billion for Israel, and the remaining $30 billion for Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific, and border security.

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[79] Daniel DePetris, "Is the Biden Administration's Ukraine policy sustainable?" *Defense News*, August 29, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/08/29/is-the-biden-administrations-ukraine-policy-sustainable/.

[80] DePetris, "Is the Biden administration's Ukraine policy sustainable?"

[81] *Ibid.*

[82] Thomas S. Warrick, "It's all about the money–and vital U.S. national interests," in "Experts react to Biden's 'inflection point' address on Ukraine and Israel," *Atlantic Council*, October 19, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-to-bidens-inflection-point-address-on-ukraine-and-israel/.

"We are facing an inflection point in history," said President Biden. He also told Americans that the cost of walking away from the conflicts in Ukraine and Israel would be much higher. It would embolden aggressors elsewhere. It would threaten national security. It would erode American credibility. Ukraine and Israel, Biden noted, are democracies attacked by authoritarians bent on their destruction. Stopping them is consistent with American values.[83] President Biden framed the argument in terms of American power and responsibility, stating that "American leadership is what holds the world together." Analysts commented that this was "an application of U.S. grand strategy from Truman to Reagan."[84] Critics pointed out that Biden did not outline a way out of the conflicts or define the precise goals the United States sought to achieve by supporting Ukraine.[85]

Aside from political pronouncements, current U.S. military aid to Ukraine consists of appropriations by the U.S. Congress (a total over two years, 2022 and 2023, is $48 billion) and commitment from the U.S. administration (a total of $44.5 billion). As of November 2023, the actual military aid delivered to the Ukrainian territory is $20.2 billion, most of it delivered within the first 18 months (recently the level has been reduced to $200 million per month, a reduction of 80%). This $20 billion divided by 20 months of war equals $1 billion per month. Russia spends $15 billion per month, whereas Ukraine spends $3 billion plus $1 billion of U.S. aid and another $1 billion from European partners. The ratio of Russia's $15 billion for the war effort is three times larger than Ukraine's $5 billion per month. During World War II, the United States provided military aid to the United Kingdom in the amount of $40 billion per month, 40 times more than for Ukraine, but the United Kingdom was stronger to resist Nazi aggression. In his interview with Jason Jay Smart, Andrey Illarionov, a former economic policy advisor to Vladimir Putin, concluded that if the United States with partners do not step up the military aid, they put Ukraine in a position to be destroyed by the aggressor. Putin will move until he is physically stopped; Moldova and the Baltic States will be next.[86]

Lenin's policies toward Ukraine in the 1920s, which laid the groundwork for genocide,[87] were carried out by Stalin in the 1930s. Today, the intention to destroy the Ukrainian nation is openly broadcast in state-sponsored media and on Russian

[83] John E. Herbst, "Biden's second bravura presidential moment in two days is a legacy-builder," in *ibid*.

[84] Daniel Fried, "This was an application of U.S. grand strategy from Truman to Reagan," in *ibid*.

[85] Matthew Kroenig, "Biden made strong points, but failed to explain why Ukraine and Israel matter to everyday Americans," in *ibid*.

[86] "I Worked with Putin: Here's What You Don't Know About Him," interview with Andrey Illarionov by Jason Jay Smart, *Kyiv Post*, November 20, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2AwAXcScds.

[87] "Draft Theses of the Central Committee RKP(b) Concerning Policy in the Ukraine," in Richard Pipes, ed., *The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archive* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 76–77; quoted with analysis in Victoria A. Malko, *The Ukrainian Intelligentsia and Genocide: The Struggle for History, Language, and Culture in the 1920s and 1930s* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 23–25.

state television.[88] In a video posted online in October 2022 Pavel Gubarev, a Russian proxy official in the so-called Donetsk People's Republic, brazenly threatened to kill millions or exterminate all Ukrainians, making clear the ruthless nature of the aggression: "We'll kill as many [of you] as we have to: 1 million, 5 million or [we will] exterminate all of you."[89]

On April 14, 2022, the Ukrainian parliament passed a resolution categorizing actions of the Russian leadership, military, and security forces as genocide.[90] U.S. President Joseph Biden also referred to Russian President Putin's actions in Ukraine as genocide.[91] Currently, there are two resolutions pending in Congress recognizing Russia's actions in Ukraine as genocide.[92] The acts committed by Putin's neo-Stalinist regime in Ukraine since February 2022 align with the definition of genocide outlined in Article II of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Russian forces have directly participated in:

- killing Ukrainian men, women, and children in a variety of ways, including summary executions, missile strikes, shelling, targeting Ukrainian political activists, journalists, veterans, religious leaders, lawyers, writers for liquidation;
- causing serious bodily and mental harm through multiple, systematic tactics that have escalated over time, including extensive, industrialized-scale torture in chambers, camps, and detention centers created and funded for this purpose; using rape and sexual violence against women, men, and children age 4 to 82 years old across nine regions of Ukraine; leaving behind mines

[88] Timofey Sergeytsev, "Chto Rossiia dolzhna sdelat' s Ukrainoy", *RIA Novosti*, 3 aprelia 2022, https://ria.ru/20220403/ukraina-1781469605.html. Just Security, based at the Reiss Center on Law and Security at New York University School of Law, compiled publicly available statements by Russian politicians and other officials under the title "Russia's Eliminationist Rhetoric Against Ukraine" which provided evidence of genocidal intent toward the people of Ukraine. For further information, see: https://www.justsecurity.org/81789/russias-eliminationist-rhetoric-against-ukraine-a-collection/?fbclid=IwAR29ba5Z2aP7_VnMW-cM6YJk5Mndo1RS7PyFTLqhL4l23_Gj8kWkvZxgTyb8.

[89] Nick Mordowanec, "Activist Promises to 'Exterminate' All Ukrainians Who Won't Switch Sides," *Newsweek*, October 11, 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/activist-promises-exterminate-all-ukrainians-who-wont-switch-sides-1750839.

[90] "Rada vyznala dii viys'k Rosii v Ukrayini henotsydom ukrayins'koho narodu," *Radio Svoboda*, 14 kvitnia 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-rada-vyznala-diyi-viysk-henotsydom/31803585.html.

[91] Shannon Pettypiece and Zoë Richards, "Biden says Russia is committing 'genocide' in Ukraine," *NBC News*, April 12, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-calls-putin-actions-ukraine-genocide-rcna24131.

[92] H.Res.1205 resolution recognizing Russian actions in Ukraine as a genocide, introduced by Rep. Steve Cohen (D-TN) on June 24, 2022, with 23 cosponsors, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-resolution/1205; and S.Res.713 resolution recognizing Russian actions in Ukraine as a genocide, introduced by Sen. James E. Risch (R-ID) on July 20, 2022, with 15 cosponsors, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-resolution/713.

and booby traps in homes, in food facilities, and on corpses; making direct and indirect nuclear threats;

- deliberately creating conditions intended to obliterate life, including the destruction of entire cities, like Mariupol, Bakhmut and others in Donetsk and Luhansk regions; targeting critical infrastructure, such as electric power grid and water supply, timed for harsh winter, to pose a significant threat to the physical survival of Ukrainians; confiscating Ukrainian grain, destroying agricultural fields and businesses, and killing farmers — all in an effort to starve the Ukrainians into submission and to create a global food crisis; denying medical services and destroying hospitals; besieging cities across Ukraine and deliberately inflicting fatal conditions on Ukrainian inhabitants (Bucha, Chernihiv); targeting schools, theaters, libraries, museums, Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, archives and heritage sites of Ukrainian history;
- preventing births within the Ukrainian national group, using sexual violence such as rape of Ukrainian women and girls to inflict trauma on the victims so that they would never want to have children or castration of male Ukrainians so that they can't have children; deporting pregnant and fertile-age women to Russia; bombing maternity hospitals to severely impact Ukraine's declining birthrate;
- forcibly transferring children to Russia or Russian-controlled territory; out of 5.3 million Ukrainians deported to Russia,[93] over 700,000 children have been forcibly transferred to orphanages or adopted into Russian families, according to Moscow-controlled news agency TASS, so that they will not know their language and culture but will instead grow up as obedient subjects of the Russian regime. Ukrainian officials have been able to verify 19,393 children's identities because Russian authorities try to conceal these forcible transfers.[94]

In March 2023, the United Nations reported that there were 8.1 million Ukrainian refugees across Europe, including 2.8 million of them in Russia.[95] Many of those in Russia were forcibly deported by Russian occupiers and subjected to a "filtration" process designed to erase Ukrainian expressions of identity. Disturbing

[93] "Za god s Ukrainy i iz Donbassa na territoriiu RF pribylo 5,3 mln bezhentsei" (5.3 million refugees arrived in Russia from Ukraine and Donbass in a year), *TASS*, February 20, 2023, https://tass.ru/obschestvo/17091725.

[94] Kristina Hook, John Packer, Erin Farrell Rosenberg, Yonah Diamond, and Christopher Atwood, *The Russian Federation's Escalating Commission of Genocide in Ukraine: A Legal Analysis*, Washington, D.C.: New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy and the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, July 2023, https://newlinesinstitute.org/rules-based-international-order/genocide/the-russian-federations-escalating-commission-of-genocide-in-ukraine-a-legal-analysis/.

[95] UNHCR, Ukraine Refugee Situation, March 28, 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.

accounts of war crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine have surfaced, include evidence of executions and torture.[96]

Looking back ninety years ago, Ukrainians had no safe haven to seek refuge. The borders of Ukraine were sealed, making escape in search of food and resources nearly impossible. As a result, Ukraine experienced a devastating demographic loss. In the 1930s, German and Italian diplomats and American medical professionals reported a death toll from 7 to 15 million.[97] While estimates vary, some Soviet, Russian, and Ukrainian historians and demographers suggest a range of 3 to 5 million victims,[98] excluding those who were starved to death or deported outside Ukraine. However, recent research by Ukrainian scholars indicates that the figure could be as high as 10.5 million, including Ukrainians who settled in regions beyond Ukraine's borders, such as the Northern Caucasus, not to mention the Central Black Earth, Lower Volga, and even Kazakhstan where Ukrainian farmers settled over the centuries.[99] Witnesses have testified that a third to a half of the population, and at times entire settlements, were wiped out. The number of the victims alone does not define genocide; rather it is the intent behind the actions.

[96] See Yonah Diamond, John Packer, Erin Farrell Rosenberg et al., *An Independent Legal Analysis of the Russian Federation's Breaches of the Genocide Convention in Ukraine and the Duty to Prevent*, Washington, D.C.: New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy and the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, May 2022, https://newlinesinstitute.org/an-independent-legal-analysis-of-the-russian-federations-breaches-of-the-genocide-convention-in-ukraine-and-the-duty-to-prevent/. In 2022, in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Global Legal Action Network (GLAN) and Bellingcat launched a set of investigations into alleged atrocity crimes taking place there. They released two reports addressing the use of open-source investigations as evidence in legal proceedings, available from https://www.glanlaw.org/oosi-reports. In 2023, an updated independent inquiry was published by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy and the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights urging the United Nations to fulfill their duty to stop the Russian escalating commission of genocide against Ukrainians. See *The Russian Federation's Escalating Commission of Genocide in Ukraine*.

[97] Mace, *Report to Congress*, 424, 475; William Horsley Gantt, "A Medical Review of Soviet Russia: Results of the First Five-Year Plan," *British Medical Journal* 2, no. 3939 (July 4, 1936): 19–22. See also appendix to Jaroslaw Sawka, "American Psychiatrist: Fifteen Million Dies in Thirties' Famine," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 65.

[98] S. V. Kul'chyts'kyy, "1933: *trahedya holodu*, Seria 1" in *Teoriia i praktyka KPRS. Istoriia*, vyp. 6 (Kyiv: T-vo "Znannia" URSR, 1989), 47; V. V. Kondrashyn, "Holod 1932–1933 hh. — obshchaia trahedyia narodov SSSR: natsyonal'no-rehyonal'nyy aspekt," v *Sovetskye natsyy y natsyonal'naia polytyka v 1920–1950-e hody: Materyaly VI mezhdunarodnoy nauchnoy konferentsyy*, Kyev, 10–12 oktiabria 2013 h., red. N. Volynchyk (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2014), 195; Serhey Maksudov (Aleksandr Babenyshev), "Byl ly holod 1932–33 hodov na Ukrayne henotsydom?" Bloh Serheia Maksudova, 16 sentiabria 2016 h., http://www.maksudovsergei.com/; Omelian Rudnytskyi, Nataliia Levchuk, Oleh Wolowyna, Pavlo Shevchuk, and Alla Kovbasiuk, "Demography of a Man-made Human Catastrophe: The Case of Massive Famine in Ukraine, 1932–1933," *Canadian Studies in Population* 42, no. 1–2 (2015): 53–80.

[99] Roman Tesliuk, Nataliia Andrusyshyn, Mariia Bachyns'ka, "Teoretyko-metodychni pidkhody do rozuminnia zmistu katehorii 'demohrafichni vtraty' Holodomoru-henotsydu 1932–1933 rr. ta henotsydu v Ukrayini 2022 r." *Interdystsyplinarni pidkhody u doslidzhenni Holodomoru-henotsydu: materialy V Mizhnarodnoi naukovo-praktychnoyi konferentsii (m. Kyiv, 25 lystopada 2021 roku)* (Kyiv: Instytut doslidzhennia Holodomoru Natsional'noho muzeiu Holodomoru-henotsydu, 2022).

According to Article II of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, all the genocidal acts listed apply to the Holodomor:

a) people who resisted were killed either through executions or forced starvation;
b) there was huge bodily and mental harm caused to all victims, both those who died and those who survived;
c) there were artificially created conditions of life calculated to destroy the Ukrainians, including deportations, blacklisting, confiscations of grain and everything edible, passport regime, travel ban, forced labor in concentration camps, and forced resettlement outside the borders of Ukraine in the Russian Far North and Siberia;
d) these measures prevented births within the Ukrainian national group; and
e) children were forcibly transferred from their parents and placed in state-run orphanages where they were raised in accordance with communist ideology and subservience to the colonial regime.[100]

Myroslava Antonovych, argues that the list of genocidal acts in Article II of the U.N. Convention on Genocide is exhaustive: acts a) through, c) constitute physical genocide, act d) contains a concept of biological genocide, and act e) constitutes cultural genocide.[101] However, narrow focus on the collectivization and grain requisition campaigns as the sole causes of the "famine" diminishes the severity of crime of nation killing to a mere mismanagement of agricultural policies.[102] In 1953, Raphael Lemkin referred to the Soviet actions in Ukraine as a "classic case of genocide,"[103] emphasizing that it was an intentional destruction of a people and

[100] Myroslava Antonovych, "Individual and Collective Intent in the Crime of Genocide (on the Example of the Holodomor-Genocide against the Ukrainian Nation)," *Actual Problems of International Relations*, no. 145 (2020): 54–61.

[101] Antonovych, "Individual and Collective Intent," 59.

[102] H.Res.105 Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Ukrainian famine of 1932–1933, known as the Holodomor, is recognized as a genocide and should serve as a reminder of repressive Soviet policies against the people of Ukraine. It was introduced by Rep. Don Bacon (R-NE) with three cosponsors on February 8, 2023.

[103] Raphael Lemkin, "Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine" (typewritten notes), folder 16, box 2, reel 3, ZL-273, "The Raphael Lemkin Papers, 1947–1959," Rare Books and Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library. Steven Jacobs, Roman Serbyn, and Marko Suprun located the text of the speech in the New York Public Library. The manuscript was first quoted in Jean-Louis Panné, "Rafaël Lemkin ou le pouvoir d'un sans-pouvoir," introduction to Rafaël Lemkin, *Qu'est-ce qu'un génocide?* (Monaco: Édition du Rocher, 2008), 7–66. The full text of the speech was first published as an appendix in *Holodomor: Reflections on the Great Famine of 1932–1933 in Soviet Ukraine*, eds. Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Lisa Grekul (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 2008), 235–42. It was translated into six official languages of the United Nations and 22 other languages and edited by Roman Serbyn and Olesia Stasiuk, *Raphael Lemkin: Soviet Genocide in Ukraine (Article in 28 Languages)* (Kyiv: Maisternia knyhy, 2009), available from https://holodomormuseum.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/978-966-2260-15-1.pdf. For a complete text with a facsimile of the manuscript and an introduction by Douglas Irvin-Erickson, see Raphael Lemkin, *Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine*, ed. Lubomyr Y. Luciuk (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 2014).

their culture, which included forced Russification. Those who refuse to acknowledge it as such raise the bar on the threshold of violence required before calling it what it is — a genocide committed against the Ukrainian people.

Conclusion

Ukraine has been the epicenter of the century-old "Cold War" between Russia and the West. The U.S. government's response in the 1920s and 1930s ignored the victims in the quest for a "greater good" to "make the world safe for democracy" and in the struggle against a "greater evil" to rid the world of Nazism. With the storming of the U.S. Capitol and then America's shambolic withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia's leaders felt a decline in U.S. power and subsequently unleashed genocidal violence with the aim of annihilating the Ukrainian nation. While the Biden administration has called the Russian actions in Ukraine a "genocide," it has yet to acknowledge the Holodomor as its precursor, the crime that remains unpunished.

In *Black Book of Communism*, Polish scholars argued that from the Bolshevik *coup d'état* in 1917 to the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, driven by the ideology of creating *Homo Sovieticus*,[104] secret police persecuted, tortured and eventually executed 60 million innocent victims.[105] Demographers estimated that Ukrainians account for 29.5 million of the victims in the twentieth century social catastrophes.[106] In the twenty-first century, the stakes are even higher for Ukraine's people as this crime is being repeated again. The perpetrators are the descendants of secret police operatives who served in the Cheka–GPU–NKVD–KGB–FSB. To quote Robert Conquest:

> until this horrible piece of history is openly exposed and denounced by the successors of Stalin it remains a demonstration of the background against which they made their careers, and of the system as a whole. Until they publicly purge themselves of this guilt, until they break with this horror in their past, they remain not only its heirs, but also its accomplices.[107]

[104] Eugene Lyons first introduced the term *Homo Sovieticus* in his *Our Secret Allies: The Peoples of Russia* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1953), 371.

[105] S. Courtois, "Zbrodnie komunizmu," in *Czarna księga komunizmu. Zbrodnie, terror, prześladowania* (The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Persecution) by K. Bartosek, S. Courtois, J.-L. Margolin, A. Paczkowski, J.-L. Panné, N. Werth (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka, 1999). Rudolf Rummel wrote about 61,911,000 victims of the USSR in *Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder since 1917* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1990).

[106] Hladun, "Viddaleni naslidky vtrat naselennia Ukrainy…," 337–47.

[107] Robert Conquest, *Kolyma: The Arctic Death Camps* (New York: Viking Press, 1978), 231.

"Whether or not the American people desire it, the historical development of world affairs is leading America at an ever-accelerating pace toward a final showdown with aggressive Russian imperialism. This America must face, not only as the leader of the Western world, but also as the defender of her own security and independence," warned Ukrainian scholars in 1956.[108] In 2023, American scholars admit that getting the Russian war of aggression to end with a Ukrainian victory would be by far the best thing Americans could do for themselves.[109]

[108] Vasyl Hryshko, *Experience with Russia* (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1956), 148–54.

[109] Timothy Snyder, "The State of the War: Thoughts from Kyiv," *Thinking about…*, September 7, 2023, https://open.substack.com/pub/snyder/p/the-state-of-the-war.